This paper investigates the relative importance of hot money in bank credit and portfolio flows from the US to 18 emerging markets over the period 1988-2012. We deploy state-space models à la Kalman filter to identify the unobserved hot money as the temporary component of each type of flow. The analysis reveals that the importance of hot money relative to the permanent component in bank credit flows has significantly increased during the 2000s relative to the 1990s. This finding is robust to controlling for the influence of push and pull factors in the two unobserved components. The evidence supports indirectly the view that global banks have played an important role in the transmission of the global financial crisis to emerging markets, and endorses the use of regulations to manage international capital flows.
Introduction
International capital flows increased dramatically in the 1990s and it has been argued that they eventually led to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998; Kaminsky, 1999; Chari and Kehoe, 2003) . International capital flows resurged again until the late 2000s
Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Global capital flows increased rapidly from less than 7% of world GDP in 1998 to over 20% in 2007, but suffer large reversals in late 2008, with bank credit flows being hit the hardest (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011; Tong and Wei, 2011; Forbes and Warnock, 2012) . Is this reversal of global capital flows due to hot money?
The term hot money has been most commonly used for capital moving from one country to another in order to earn a short-term profit on interest rate differentials or anticipated exchange rate shifts. This speculative capital can lead to market instability (Martin and Morrison, 2008; Chari and Kehoe, 2003) . 1 Recently, the equity premium has been suggested as a driver of hot money (Guo and Huang, 2010) . Instead of ascertaining driving factors, some studies have sought to identify hot money via the unobserved-component models by focusing on its temporariness and reversibility aspects (see, e.g, Sarno and Taylor, 1999a, b) .
A surge in hot money to emerging markets (EMs) may be destabilizing and trigger regulation, of which examples abound since 2009 such as Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand among other countries. Thus, measuring hot money becomes crucial for appropriate policy design (IMF, 2011; Ostry et al., 2010; McCauley 2010; Korinek, 2011) .
It is well known that distinct types of capital flows have distinct degrees of reversibility (Tong and Wei, 2011; Sarno and Taylor, 1999a) . 2 In fact, a key feature of the post-1990s trend 1 Huge movements of hot money have been historically not atypical in fixed exchange rate systems (e.g., during the final years of the Bretton Woods system). Recently, there is a growing interest on carry trade, seen as a type of hot money (McKinnon and Schnabl, 2009; McCauley, 2010; McKinnon, 2013; McKinnon and Liu, 2013) . 2 It is usually referred as the composition hypothesis. The rationale is that a more volatile form of capital will be more likely to fly out of the country in crisis. Tong and Wei (2011) do not find a connection between a country's in capital flows to EMs up until the GFC is the dramatic resurgence of international bank credit flows relative to equity and bond flows (Bank for International Settlements, 2009; Goldberg 2009 ). Using Bank for International Settlements (BIS) statistics, Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) show that the holdings of cross-border bank credit at year-end has increased notably, especially, during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] and reached about 60% of world GDP. Thus, banking flows were hit the hardest compared to other types of capital flows during the GFC ( Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011) . It is also recognized that the recent bank globalisation process has played a major role in the GFC transmission (Aiyar, 2012; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011, 2012a,b; De Haas and Van Horen, 2013; Giannetti and Laeven, 2012) .
Such recent developments in international capital flows and especially in bank credit flows raise questions such as whether the banking sector played a key role in the transmission of the crisis to emerging markets as the literature on bank globalisation suggests. Related to that is the question how the relative amount of hot money in bank credit, and portfolio (equity and bond) flows has evolved in recent years, particularly, in the run-up to the late 2000s GFC?
This paper takes up the latter question by probing whether the relative importance of hot money in bank credit and portfolio flows to EMs has changed over the period. We start by deploying unobserved component (or state-space) models à-la Kalman filter to gauge the temporariness of international capital flows from the US to 9 Asian countries and 9 Latin American countries which have attracted substantial capital flows over period the 1988 to 1997.
We are able to confirm the earlier findings of Sarno and Taylor (1999a, b) over a similar time period and using a similar methodology. On average in the [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] period, portfolio flows (i.e., equity and bond flows) were largely temporary but, in contrast, bank credit is found to be more permanent than temporary. This supports the widely held view that hot money in portfolio flows played a key role in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
Reestimating the models over the full sample period from 1988 to 2012 our results reveal exposure to capital flows and the extent of the liquidity crunch experienced by its manufacturing firms when they just include total volumes of capital inflows. However, they argue this masks an important compositional effect, as a different but consistent pattern emerges when they disaggregate capital flows into three types (FDI, foreign portfolio flows and foreign loans). This empirical evidence suggests that aggregating different capital flows may not be appropriate when one wishes to understand the connection between capital flows and a liquidity crunch in a crisis. See also Neumann et al. (2009) and Levchenko and Mauro (2007) .
an important change: bank credit has gradually become more temporary in the recent decade, while the temporariness of portfolio flows has stayed roughly the same. Third, since the change of sample periods brings about completely different results for bank credit, we deploy the models over the recent sub-sample, 1998 to 2012, and the results confirm that bank credit has a marked temporary component. The dramatic resurgence of international bank credit in this recent decade broadly coincides with the period of banking sector globalization.
We provide additional evidence on the temporariness of the capital flows by estimating 'structural' state-space models which include global (push) and domestic (pull) macro factors as potential drivers of both latent components, permanent and transitory. This constitutes a methodological novelty and can be motivated as an attempt to incorporate fundamentals (i.e., adding some economic 'structure' to the state-space decomposition) in the unobserved components analysis of capital flows. To our knowledge, no previous study that assesses the importance of the temporary (vis-à-vis the permanent) part of international capital flows has deployed 'structural' state-space models that control for push/pull factors. Altogether the empirical analysis in the paper is intended to provide robust evidence on the relative importance of the temporary (hot money) and permanent components of capital flows.
Our finding of high temporariness in bank credit, equity and bond flows over the most recent decade suggests that all three types of capital flows have been dominated by hot money and hence, prone to large reversals. Thus, the paper provides indirect supporting evidence that hot money is a channel of crisis transmission and, most importantly, that global banks might have played an important role in the transmission of the recent financial crisis to emerging markets. Thus our analysis reinforces the main contention in Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) on the role of bank lending in the GFC transmission.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 provides some background literature. Sections 3 and 4 outline the data and empirical methodology, respectively. The empirical results are discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes with a summary and policy implications. 5
Background Literature
Our paper relates to two strands of the literature. It directly draws upon studies that seek to identify 'hot money' in bank credit and/or portfolio flows. It is also linked, albeit more indirectly, with studies investigating the mechanisms of transmission of the late 2000s GFC.
One intriguing question about the GFC is how the US Subprime Crisis engulfed the entire world. 3 Initially, it was hoped that emerging markets (EMs) would stay unscathed as reforms were designed to insulate their economies from adverse foreign shocks (Kamin and DeMarco, 2012) . These hopes evaporated by the fall of 2008 when many EMs without direct exposure to the 'toxic' assets, which were at the root of the financial crisis in advanced economies experienced sharp declines both in output and equity markets (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011) .
The literature has identified various channels of cross-country transmission of financial turmoil: i) through tangible real and/or direct financial linkages (e.g., trade, portfolio investment and bank loans), ii) through reassessment of fundamentals (e.g., wake-up calls), iii) through market sentiment (e.g., self-fulfilling panic). 4 Hot money in portfolio flows has been shown to play a key role in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998; Kaminsky, 1999; Sarno and Taylor, 1999b; Chari and Kehoe, 2003) .
More recent papers have attempted to shed light on the global incidence of the GFC. Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) show that the turnaround for international capital flows has been much sharper than that for trade flows. Theoretical models have been developed to show how crises in one area of the world 3 Securities backed by subprime mortgages account only for about 3% of US financial assets (Eichengreen et al., 2012) . Kamin and DeMarco (2012) examine whether industrial countries that held large amounts of US mortgagebacked securities experienced a greater degree of financial distress during the GFC but find no evidence of such direct spillovers. 4 For reviews of the various channels of crisis transmission, see Kamin and DeMarco (2012) and Forbes (2012) .
economy prompt hot money to flow into other areas (Korinek, 2011) . However, there is no well-defined direct method for identifying the amount of hot money flowing into a country during a certain period. A widely-used tool is accounting labels. Hot money is traditionally defined as speculative or short-term international capital flows but it is difficult to track the (non)speculative nature of capital flows; the only measurable key characteristic of hot money has been its short-term aspect, especially before the 1990s. The balance-of-payment statistics of the IMF, World Bank and US Treasury sub-categorize various types of capital flows as shortterm and long-term using one year as the typical threshold. Thus, any capital flowing into a country and staying there for more than a year is categorized as 'not hot money '. Claessens et al. (1995) raises scepticism about the information value of accounting labels.
Typically, the notion that short-term flows are more volatile than long-term flows is based on the fact that short-term-maturity inflows need to be repaid more quickly than long-term inflows.
Although rapid repayment may lead to higher volatility of gross short-term flows, it need not make net flows more volatile. Short-term flows that are rolled over are equivalent to long-term assets, and a disruption of gross FDI inflows, for example, can cause its net flow to be equivalent to a repayment of a short-term flow. Their analysis suggests that the "short-term"
and "long-term" accounting labels of capital flows do not provide a reliable indication of their degree of temporariness or reversibility. Levchenko and Mauro (2007) show that, under accounting labels, differences across types of flows are limited with respect to volatility, persistence, cross-country comovement, and correlation with growth at home and worldwide.
However, consistent with conventional wisdom, FDI is the least volatile form of financial flow, particularly, during episodes of sudden stops; portfolio debt flows and, to a greater extent, bank flows and trade credits, mostly account for the latter.
Focusing instead on the time-series properties of observed capital flows, state-space models are utilized by Sarno and Taylor (1999a) to compare the size of their permanent and temporary components during the period [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] . They find a significant temporary-topermanent ratio in equity and bond flows, but not so in bank credit. Following this lead, Sarno and Taylor (1999b) Based on this idea and the unprecedented resurgence of cross-border bank credit in the era of banking sector globalisation, there is growing support for the view that bank lending played a major role in the transmission of the GFC. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) provide evidence in this regard using a cross-section of industrialized countries and a broad panel of EMs.
Focusing on syndicated loans, Giannetti and Laeven (2012) show that banks exhibit a strong home bias during crises which materializes in a significant decrease in the proportion of foreign loans and a reduction in the extension of new loans. 5 None of the above papers studies the temporariness (or 'hot money' component) of bank credit flows from the US to EMs in the new century. This is an important task given the background of the banking sector globalisation and the GFC. Our paper fills this gap.
Description of Variables and Preliminary Data Analysis

Capital Flows
We employ data on US capital flows to 9 Asian and 9 Latin American countries from January 1988 to December 2012. 6 The Asian countries are Mainland China, Taiwan China, India, 5 Various microeconomic studies document a significant transmission of bank liquidity shocks to EMs; see, for instance, Khwaja and Mian (2008) for Pakistan, and Schnabl (2012) for Peru. 6 Of more relevance for the purposes of this paper is the distinction between two definitions of hot money: de jure hot money, which is generally associated with accounting labels and based solely on data categories given in balance-of-payments statistics, and de facto hot money, which focuses on the temporary time-series properties of respective capital flows (Agosin and Huaita, 2011 We use monthly data on US portfolio (equity and bond) flows in US$ millions to EMs collected from the US Treasury International Capital (TIC) database. 8 As previous studies, we use a net measure of equity flows and a gross measure of bond flows. The main motivation for using gross bond flows is to abstract from the effect of sterilization policy actions and other types of reserve operations by the monetary authorities (Chuhan et al., 1998; Taylor and Sarno, 1997; Sarno and Taylor, 1999a; Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Sarno et al., 2014) . The TIC database reports "gross purchases by foreigners" which we classify as US sales and "gross sales by foreigners" which we classify as US purchases. We employ quarterly data on US bank credit flows to EMs which is obtained from the US Treasury Bulletin.
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Our analysis of capital flows is based on data over the 24-year period from 1988 to 2012.
This allows us to replicate the analysis for the 1990s conducted by Sarno and Taylor (1999a) , and to investigate further whether the role of 'hot money' in bank credit, equity and bond flows has experienced any significant change thereafter. Since the capital flows are expressed in US dollars, we scale them by the US consumer price index (CPI) from Datastream to control for any inflationary effects. We also conduct the analysis on the un-scaled capital flows, and the (unreported but available upon request) results are broadly similar in line with the fact that US inflationary pressures have been rather limited over the sample period.
Our data allows us to measure not only traditional banking linkages (direct cross-border 7 These are the same countries considered in Sarno and Taylor (1999a) and Chuhan et al. (1998) . 8 The US international portfolio investment transactions are tracked by the Department of Treasury (DOT), the International Capital Form S reports and the International Capital Form B reports. Operationally, the 12 district Federal Reserve Banks, principally the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, maintain contact with the respondents, and ensure the accuracy and integrity of the information provided (Kester, 1995) . The DOT compiles the data and publishes in its Quarterly Bulletin. This database has been widely used in the international finance literature (e.g. Werner, 1994, 1995; Bekaert et al., 2002) . Appendix A provides further details. 9 The US Treasury Bulletin compiles data on foreign claims as reported by US banks and other depository institutions, brokers and dealers. Data on bank claims held for their own account are collected monthly. A comprehensive sample on bank credit flows (e.g., including domestic customer claims and foreign currency claims) is only available quarterly; see section on Capital Movements, Table CM-II-2 and Table CM lending) but also indirect ones through an affiliate in the borrower's country (internal capital market). Cross-border lending is a well-known channel of transmission. However, there is recent evidence that banks are setting up branches and subsidiaries in foreign locations to serve clients (Forbes, 2012; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012a, b) . Applying basic corporate finance principles, it has been conjectured that global banks can respond to a funding shock by activating capital markets internal to the organization, reallocating funds across locations in response to their relative needs. Peek and Rosengren (1997) , show how the drop in Japanese stock prices in 1990 could lead Japanese bank branches in the US to reduce credit. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012a) provide evidence of actual cross border, intra-bank funding flows between global banks' head offices and their foreign operations in response to domestic shocks.
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012b) confirm the existence of an active cross-border, internal capital market and show high heterogeneity across branches in lending response.
Our data choices are geared towards capturing financial transactions that involve both a US resident and a foreign resident; a US resident includes any individual, corporation, or organization (including branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates of foreign entities) located in the US. In addition, any entity incorporated in the US system is considered a US resident even if it has no physical presence. Thus, a US branch of a Japanese bank is considered a US resident, and a London branch of a US bank is considered a foreign resident.
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The cross-border definition means that the data on foreign purchases of US securities include only those transactions that involve both a US seller and a foreign purchaser. These data exclude US-to-US transactions, e.g. transactions where the seller is a US securities broker and the purchaser is a US-based branch of a Japanese securities firm. They also exclude foreign-to-foreign transactions in securities, e.g. a purchase by a Japanese-resident broker of US Treasuries from a London-based broker. Appendix A provides further details.
Preliminary Data Analysis
We begin by plotting the time-series of net equity, net bond and net bank credit flows to Asian Table I provides summary statistics for net bank credit flows, net equity flows and gross bond flows from the US to emerging markets over the period 1988-2012. 11 The ADF unit root test results broadly confirm that bank credit and bond flows have a unit root. However, the evidence for equity flows is less clearcut as the tests suggest non-stationarity over the early sample period of Sarno and Taylor (1999a) but stationarity over the full sample. Since there is no economic theory to suggest that equity flows have a drastically different data generating process from bank and credit flows, following the extant literature we conceptualize all three flows as realizations from first-difference stationary processes. 12 Hence, it makes sense to gauge the relative importance of their permanent and stationary components.
All three categories of capital flows to Asia surpass in size those to Latin America over the period under study. For most countries, the average net bank credit flows are negative, meaning that the US has been on the whole 'financed' by EMs in this category of capital.
Average net equity flows are positive for all Asian countries but, in sharp contrast, mostly negative for Latin American countries (with the exception of Brazil, which shows a relatively 11 As mentioned earlier we use a net measure of equity flows and a gross measure of bond flows to abstract from the effect of sterilization policy actions and other types of reserve operations by the monetary authorities (Chuhan et al., 1998; Taylor and Sarno, 1997; Sarno and Taylor, 1999a; Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Sarno et al., 2012) . Appendix B provides summary statistics for net bond flows. 12 Our methodology for the analysis of capital flows rests on the assumption that the dynamics of their unobserved persistent component can be approximated by a random walk model. However, as borne out by the mixed results of the unit root tests, other specifications could be plausible alternatives such as those in the autoregressive fractionally integrated moving average class known as ARFIMA models that can generate very persistent (non)stationary data. The random walk process is adopted because it is rather parsimonious (which helps in identification) and to ensure comparability with the prior literature (see e.g., Sarno and Taylor, 1999a ).
large positive average net equity flow in contrast to all other Latin American countries, and
Argentina to a lesser extent). Thus, over the sample period the US has financed all Asian EMs but only two Latin American countries (Brazil by a large amount, and Argentina) via net equity flows. However, the size of bank credit flows belittles the size of equity flows. Finally, capital flows to Asia appear more volatile than the flows to Latin America in all categories.
State-Space Models
Our analysis of the dynamics of capital flows is based on state-space (or unobserved components) models. One benefit of representing a dynamic system in state space form is that unobserved variables can be incorporated and estimated along with the observable variables.
State space models have been widely used in economics to model latent variables such as (rational) expectations, permanent income and unobserved components such as trends and cycles. State-space models will allow us to decompose the observed bank, equity and bond flows into unobserved permanent and temporary components as it is explained next.
Let t y denote the observed capital flow for a given country at time t. The unobserved components formulation of the capital flow is as follows 
with coefficients ( 1 + 2 ) < 1, ( 1 − 2 ) < 1, | 2 | < 1 and error  t~2 . . . (0, ) 
and a transition equation describing the dynamics of the state variables 
The above equations can be written more compactly to express the model as
for t=1, . . . ,T, where H is a 13 unit vector, F , R and Q are 33 matrices, and t β is the unobservable 31 state vector. State-space models can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood (ML) using the recursive Kalman filter algorithm which is described in Appendix C.
In order to gauge the relative role of the temporary and permanent components of capital flows, we employ the Q-ratio, a standard scalar measure in the state-space modelling literature (bounded between 0 and 1) whose inputs are the elements of the disturbance covariance matrix Q. For instance, the Q-ratio of the permanent component is defined as 
Empirical Results
We begin by analyzing the state-space model estimates and diagnostics for bank credit flows in order to gauge the importance of 'hot money'. Then we proceed similarly with the equity and bond flows. The analysis is conducted over the [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] and full periods.
Reduced-form unobserved components model
Hot Money in Bank Credit
Has the amount of 'hot money' in bank credit flows become more relevant over the recent decade? To address this question, we discuss the state-space modelling results corresponding to the first subperiod (1988-1997), extended period (1988-2012) and most recent period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) which are shown in Table II These findings are well aligned with the empirical evidence in Sarno and Taylor (1999a) .
However, Table II quarters is low (below 6 quarters), implying that bank credit to Mainland China has become dominated by "hot money" over the most recent 15-year period. As clearly shown in Table II (Panel A), over the first subsample period [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] none of the countries meets the two conditions which allows us to conclude that banking flows are dominated by a permanent component pre-1990s in line with the prior literature. In sharp contrast, as Table II (Panel C) shows, the same unobserved component models estimated post-1990s reveal that all countries except two (Argentina and Brazil with half-lives of 7 and 9 quarters, respectively) meet both conditions. This allows us to conclude that the relative role of "hot money" in bank credit has increased notably in the years leading to and during the GFC.
Hot Money in Portfolio Flows
Next we discuss the state-space model estimates and diagnostics for equity and bond flows which are reported in Tables III and IV, respectively. Again we deploy the models separately over the three sample periods: 1988-1997, 1988-2012, and 1998-2012 
Unobserved components model with push/pull factors
A potential criticism of the reduced-form model on which the results thus far are based is that it lacks economic content. In order to shield our analysis from this criticism, we now reformulate the state-space models by incorporating one-period lagged macroeconomic factors as potential exogenous variables both in the permanent and temporary components of the flows.
The aim is to impose some economic 'structure' to the state-space models with the purpose of adding robustness to our key finding that bank credit flows are newly characterized by a weighty temporary component (hot money) during the post-1997 era. Q-ratios thus computed from the covariance matrix Q of white noise residuals, account for the impact of the economic drivers. To our knowledge, no previous study that assesses the relative importance of the temporary (versus permanent) component of bank credit, equity and bond flows has deployed 'structural' state-space models that control for push/pull factors. Such models have been mainly used in the context of order flows and high-frequency trading (Menkveld et al., 2007; Brogaard et al., 2013; Hendershott and Menkveld, 2014) .
We employ the following parsimonious state-space model with macro drivers
where Zj,t denotes the jth macroeconomic factor, and ( ,  )′ are white noise error terms. The total number of push/pull factors, J, which cannot be too large due to degrees of freedom constraints in estimation; to illustrate, the inclusion of say J=5 factors in the state-space model implies ten additional parameters to estimate.
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This unobserved components model, equation (10), serves the purpose of addressing the potential criticism that the original model, equations (1) to (3), is a purely statistical decomposition of the flows into the latent temporary and permanent parts without any economic content. Instead, in this reformulation we extract the latent permanent and temporary components of the capital flows while controlling for various observed factors that have been shown in previous studies to be potential drivers.
Choosing an appropriate set of pull and push factors {Z1,t, Z2,t,…,ZJ,t} is a non-trivial task because they ought to be relevant drivers for both the permanent and temporary components.
Earlier studies have considered investor-fear risk, liquidity risk and interest rate risk as push (or global) factors, and depth of the financial system, real GDP growth, country indebtedness and capital controls as pull (or domestic) factors (see Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Fratzscher, 2012; Sarno, et al., 2013) . However, a parallel literature has suggested other push/pull factors, that we describe below, as important drivers of hot money. We consider both sets in turn. push factors the US interest rate and US equity index; and as pull factors, the EM interest rate, EM equity index, and the exchange rate defined as units of EM currency per US dollar. Strictly speaking, however, since the exchange rate has a US side and an EM side, it can be categorized as either push or a pull factor. Both interest rates and the exchange rate have been extensively used as drivers in the literature on carry trade, which has been categorised as hot money. 14 We include equity indices for two reasons. First, equity return differences in the US and EMs could trigger capital flows to globally re-allocate assets, either because of return-chasing or portfoliorebalancing motives (Bekaert et al., 2002) . Second, the equity market is commonly seen as a 13 The above state-space model is an extension of the specification referred to as "Model 5" in Appendix D. It parsimoniously decomposes the flows into a permanent part and a temporary part without irregular components and drifts. After the inclusion of push or push and pull factors as explanatory variables, the irregular component and drifts decrease quickly, becoming insignificant. A similar model has been used in a different literature (Menkveld et al., 2007; Brogaard et al., 2013; Hendershott and Menkveld, 2014) . 14 The carry trade is a popular currency trading strategy that invests in high-interest currencies by borrowing in low-interest currencies. This strategy is at the core of active currency management and is designed to exploit deviations from uncovered interest parity.
confidence barometer, with a sharp decline often preceding an economic crisis, which makes hot money in bank credit responsive to the dynamics of the equity market (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998 Reinhart , 1999 Kaminsky, 1999; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009 ).
Regarding our priors, we expect the US interest rate to impact negatively on capital flows from the US to EMs, while the interest rate in EMs ought to have a positive impact on capital flowing from the US to EMs. Since a lower exchange rate means an appreciation of the EM currency versus the US$ which may arguably attract capital flows into EMs, it is expected that the exchange rate has a negative impact on capital flows from the US to EMs.
It is harder to form priors about the impact of the US and EMs stock markets on capital flows because the "return-chasing" and "portfolio-rebalance" hypotheses imply conflicting predictions (Bekaert et al., 2002) . According to the return-chasing hypothesis, the performance of EMs (the US) stock markets influences positively (negatively) capital flows from the US to EMs because capital flows chase sizeable stock returns. In sharp contrast, according to the portfolio-rebalance hypothesis, the EMs (US) stock market performance affects negatively (positively) capital flows from the US to EMs because investors rebalance their investment portfolio to maintain their original (planned) asset allocation. Looking now at the coefficients of the push and pull factors, our results are consistent with the previous literature in that international capital flows are highly heterogeneous both over time and across countries (Milesi-Ferretti and Tile, 2011; Fratzscher, 2012; Warnock and Forbes, 2012) . For example, Fratzscher (2012) finds the effects of economic shocks on capital flows to be highly heterogeneous across countries, with a large proportion of the cross-country heterogeneity being ascribed to differences in the quality of domestic institutions, country risk and the strength of domestic macroeconomic fundamentals (pull factors). But he further shows that push factors were overall the main drivers of capital flows in the brunt of the GFC, while pull factors have become more dominant in the recent period [2009] [2010] , in particular, for EMs.
Hence, there is evidence in the literature of both time and cross-country heterogeneity in the role of push/pull factors as drivers of capital flows.
Regarding statistical significance, we find push and pull factors to be equally important;
only marginally, push factors play a more dominant role than pull factors in the permanent component. 15 The heterogeneity of the impact of push and pull factors across countries can be seen in the close examination of three of the BRIC countries in Sarno et al. (2014) , where for
China the importance of the pull factor is close to the world average, for India is much below the world average and for Brazil for bond flows is much higher than the world average.
The signs of the push/pull factor coefficients are rather mixed in line with the large heterogeneity (over time and across countries) on the drivers of capital flows documented in the literature. In our context, it may relate to the fact that the sample includes both crisis and non-crisis periods. On the one hand, the effects of shocks on capital flows have changed markedly since the GFC erupted about seven years ago (Fratzscher, 2012) . On the other hand, as it is pointed out in Forbes and Warnock (2012) , the same factor may have a different effect on capital flows when capital flows are in different stages (Surge/Stop/Flight/Retrenchment).
For completeness, we repeat the analysis for push and pull factors used in earlier work. The push factors are investor-fear risk, liquidity risk and interest rate risk. Investor fear is proxied by the VXO, a volatility index compiled by the Chicago Board Options Exchange using S&P 100 option prices, that represents a measure of the market's expectation of stock volatility over the next 30 day period. 16 Liquidity risk is proxied by year-on-year growth in US money supply 15 We do not count the exchange rate since, as noted above, it can be seen both as a push or a pull factor. 16 The factors we consider are similar to those in Forbes and Warnock (2012) . Data on the VIX that tracks the S&P 500 index instead is only available from 2003. As it is shown in Forbes and Warnock (2012), VIX and VXO are very similar. Due also to data constraints, we use growth of money supply instead of TED spread.
(M2) and the yield on 20-year US government bonds is used for the interest rate factor. As pull factors, we consider the depth of the financial system (measured by each country's stock market capitalization divided by GDP), real GDP growth, country indebtedness (measured by public debt ratios) and capital controls (measured by Chinn-Ito indices). The data are obtained from
DataStream. The estimation of these 'structural' state-space models is conducted over the full period due to the degrees-of-freedom constraint imposed by the large number of push/pull factors. The results (unreported for space constraints but available upon request) affirm that considering this distinct set of push/pull factors makes no meaningful difference to the findings.
The temporary component in bank credit flows remains responsible for most of the variation in the bank credit flows; which is likely to reflect (as we saw earlier) the new dynamics in the post-1997 era.
Conclusions
Motivated by the dramatic increase in international capital flows in recent years, particularly (2011) provide direct evidence from a different methodology. Moreover, the findings endorse the renewed interest by policymakers in using regulations, sometimes camouflaged as prudential banking regulations, to manage international capital flows, with the tacit approval of the IMF (Ostry et al., 2010; McCauley, 2010 ). An important question that this paper does not address is what type of bank credit is most responsible for the observed change from persistence to temporariness in the recent decade. Data limitations at the time of writing preclude us from pursuing it. We leave this work for further research. 17 It is likely that various other direct channels (such as trade) and/or indirect channel (such as wake-up calls) may also have played an important role in turning the US housing slump into the GFC. -82 . 05 -20.64 57.70 30.77 -3.81 0.14 8.66 1. . 45 -185.80 519.27 276.91 -34.32 1.30 77.90 9.42 -1.32 147.88 852.32 140.05 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Equity flow Bond flow Bank credit flow Table II . State-space model for bank credit flows.
For each country, quarterly bank credit flows scaled by CPI scaled are used to estimate the state-space models listed in Appendix D. The best specification is selected using the R 2 and AIC criteria. A dash indicates that the component at hand is absent from the model. 0  Q-ratio  1 is the standard deviation of the each component over the largest standard deviation across components, computed from the variance-covariance matrix of disturbances. Column five reports the final level of the stochastic trend and its root mean square error (RMSE); * and ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level. The last column reports the p-value of the Ljung-Box test for the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation. All banks, brokers, dealers (and other financial institutions) and individuals are by law required to report the value of any long-term security transactions involving a foreign resident. American Depositary Receipts (ADR) transactions are included. Securities transactions are reported on a transactions basis. Securities transactions are recorded by the nationality of the person with whom the transaction is carried, not by the country that originally issued the security. A foreigner is any individual, branch, partnership, association, corporation or other organization located outside the United States. Additionally, securities are recorded according to the residency of the issuer and not their currency denomination.
The data collection system is specifically designed to capture US cross-border financial transactions for balance-of-payment purposes. That is, it is designed to capture only financial transactions that involve both a US resident and a foreign resident. Note that a US resident includes any individual, corporation, or organization located in the United States including branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates of foreign entities located in the United States. In addition, any corporation incorporated in the United States is considered a US resident even if it has no physical presence. Thus, a US branch of a Japanese bank is considered a US resident, and a London branch of a US bank is considered a foreign resident.
The cross-border definition means that the data on foreign purchases of US securities include only those transactions that involve both a US seller and a foreign purchaser. Thus, these data exclude any US-to-US transactions, including, for example, transactions where the seller is a US securities broker and the purchaser is a US-based branch of a Japanese securities firm. They also exclude foreign-to-foreign transactions in securities, for example if a Japanese-resident securities broker purchases US Treasuries from a London-based securities broker. Because many US securities, including US Treasury securities, trade in foreign financial markets, the data will not capture all foreign transactions in US securities.
These forms are the basis for the collection of data on purchases and sales of long-term securities, bank liabilities and bank claims by foreigners. The Treasury uses these data to provide timely and reliable information on international capital movements. This information is needed for preparation of the US capital accounts of the US balance-of-payment and the international investment position of the United States. These reports cover transaction by all banks, brokers, dealers, other financial institutions and individuals who carry transactions directly with foreigners.
Appendix B. Descriptive statistics for net bond flows.
The table reports minimum, mean, maximum, and standard deviation (S.D.) of CPI-scaled net bond flows in US$ millions from 1988M1 to 2012M12. The last column reports the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test for the null hypothesis of unit root (non-stationary) behaviour against the alternative hypothesis of stationarity; the test regression includes a constant and linear time trend and the augmentation lag order is selected with the modified AIC criterion (Ng and Perron, 2001 ). * and ** denote rejection at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using the critical values tabulated by MacKinnon (1996) 
